0xbt

A consequence that Fichte explicitly draws from this understanding of idealism is that just one can no for a longer time consider of realism as a position that is opposed to idealism. If this is so, and if the "I am" is to count on almost nothing else as its ailment, we ought to assume of the I as the merchandise of its own positing action, since it would usually be really unattainable to demonstrate its being. "I am" is therefore the expression of an Act. "I am". Up to this stage the "I am" has "only been grounded on a actuality, and possesses no other validity than that attaching to a fact" (GA I, 2, 257). But in get to discover the initial completely unconditioned theory of all understanding, we should establish not only the utter certainty of the legislation of id, but also the unconditional certainty of the "I am" in these a way that this certainty does not rely upon the existence of a point at all. For Fichte, a deed-act/Act is not intended to be a actuality, that is, a little something which is only already identified as presented, considering the fact that the Act is logically and ontologically prior to any information insofar as it in the long run constitutes (posits) every little thing which can be a truth for an I. The I, recognized as Act, is supposed to be some thing certainly posited exactly since it posits by itself, and this self-positing constitutes its essence and assures its currently being, its reality.